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Abstract
We study the effects of non-sterilized intervention on a spot foreign exchange rate using a multi-
period game-theoretical model which involves an unspecified number of competitive traders, a
finite number of strategic traders (forex dealers), and the central bank of the home country.
Simulating the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the two-stage game played by the strategic
traders in each period, we show that the non-sterilized intervention of the central bank may
lead to a perverse result. This result may arise when the intervention becomes strong enough to
unintentionally induce some of the strategic traders -who have previously traded in the direction
desired by the monetary authority- to optimally switch to the opposite trade direction.
Keywords: Exchange rate; central bank intervention; foreign exchange dealers; imperfect
competition
JEL Classification Numbers: D43; F31; G20
1 Introduction
Exchange rate intervention has been a frequently used monetary policy option through-
out the world since the 1985 Plaza Meeting of G5 industrialized countries, resulting
in an agreement on the need for coordinated intervention to stabilize the U.S. dollar
against the other major currencies. While some central banks always use either steril-
ized or non-sterilized interventions, some others alternatively use these policy options.1
1According to a survey conducted by Neely (2000) among the monetary authorities of 22 countries,
involving Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Hong Kong,
Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Poland, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Taiwan, and United States, the share of the respondents who always use sterilized interventions
is 40% and who always use non-sterilized interventions is 30%, while the remaining 30% uses sterilized
and non-sterilized interventions alternatively.
1
Under sterilized intervention, a central bank takes an action to offset the effects of its
intervention on the monetary base, so as to leave the liquidity supply in the country
unchanged. Therefore, a pure monetary approach to exchange rate determination leaves
open the questions whether and why sterilized intervention could be effective. While
some empirical evidence for the effectiveness of sterilized intervention was provided in
the early 1990s (Dominguez, 1990; Dominguez and Frankel, 1993), analytical answers as
to why it could be effective had been much earlier offered by two competing models in
international finance. Of these, the portfolio channel model (Black, 1973; Kouri, 1976;
Branson 1977; and Girton and Henderson, 1977) predicts that in financial markets where
investors diversify their domestic and foreign asset holdings with respect to risk-return
tradeoffs, a sterilized intervention that changes the composition of domestic assets must
inevitably change the return of these assets relative to foreign assets, leading to a change
in the exchange rate.
The second model, known as the signalling channel (Ross, 1977; Mussa, 1981;
Dominguez, 1992), suggests that a central bank can use the sterilized intervention as
a means of signalling its private information about future fundamentals. When the in-
vestors in a financial market find the signalling of the intervening central bank credible
and accordingly revise their expectations about future fundamentals, they would neces-
sarily change their expectations about the future spot exchange rate, leading to a change
in the current spot exchange rate. While both of these two channels implicitly assumes
that the induced response of the exchange rate to sterilized intervention is in the direc-
tion desirable for the central bank, this is not always supported by the historical data.
For example, the sterilized intervention of the Federal Reserve during the period after
the Louvre Meeting in 1987 is known to have a perverse effect on the exchange rate, as
reported by Dominguez and Frankel (1993). A theoretical explanation for this puzzle was
offered by Bhattacharya and Weller (1997) with the help of an asymmetric information
model of sterilized intervention where the central bank has private information about
the targeted foreign exchange rate whereas risk-averse speculators who can engage in
both spot and forward exchanges have private information about future spot rates. For
this model, perverse responses to sterilized interventions are associated with an upward
sloping speculative demand curve that can be observed when the effect of lowering the
spot exchange rate on the expected value of the future spot rate dominates its effect on
the current forward rate.
Unlike sterilized intervention, non-sterilized intervention is believed to have an indis-
putable effect on the exchange rate. In fact, there is a consensus among the majority
of economists that non-sterilized purchases (sales) of the home currency by the central
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bank must lead to a subsequent appreciation (depreciation) of the home currency. As
to why this prediction must be true, the literature offers various reasons. One of them
is the “interest-rate channel” (also known as the “liquidity channel”) that is present
in all standard macroeconomic models. When the central bank purchases (sells) a for-
eign currency without sterilizing it, the liquidity in the home country increases, exerting
downward pressure on the short-term nominal interest rate and consequently weakening
the home currency. A second reason is the “inventory adjustment channel” (Lyons, 1997;
2001), according to which the foreign exchange dealers always adjust the prices of their
trade orders to ensure that their inventories of foreign currencies are not undesirably
large or small at the end of any trading day. Since this channel assumes that each for-
eign exchange dealer perceives the trade order of the central bank just like the trade
order of any other foreign exchange dealer, a purchase (sell) order of the central bank
of a non-negligible amount would induce the foreign exchange dealers in the market to
increase (decrease) their prices. As another reason, the “signalling channel” -that we
have discussed above for the case of sterilized intervention- can also explain why non-
sterilized intervention works its effects in the direction desired by the central bank. In
this paper, we suggest that the common prediction shared by all these channels as to the
effectiveness of non-sterilized intervention needs not be always true. That is, we argue
that non-sterilized intervention may, too, have a perverse effect on the exchange rate.
Moreover, these perverse effects can arise due to a new channel which we call ‘strategic
trade switching’.
We obtain our findings with the help of a multi-period game-theoretical model of
foreign exchange. This model involves an unspecified number of competitive traders,
a finite number of strategic traders (forex dealers), and the central bank of the home
country, all of whom can buy and sell in a spot foreign exchange market in each period.
All competitive traders in our model are atomistic price takers: they always take the
exchange rate given and conventionally trade with respect to an upward sloping supply
function and a downward sloping demand function. Strategic traders on the other hand
have some degree of power to influence the exchange rate, enabling them to always
maximize their monetary profits from trading by optimally choosing their trade orders.
The remaining trader in our model, the central bank of the home country, has no intention
to make money through foreign exchange trade; in fact it can even lose money to the
strategic traders.2 The central bank intervenes to the foreign exchange market in order
to limit the short-run variability of the exchange rate around a prespecified target. We
2The assumption that money making is not the priority of the central bank in foreign exchange
market interventions was empirically supported by LeBaron (1999).
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assume that the central bank’s intervention is direct and non-sterilized, i.e. the central
bank intervenes by either buying or selling the foreign currency, while allowing its trades
to influence the monetary base in the home country. Since the aim of our paper is to
show the possibility of a new channel through which the non-sterilized intervention could
generate undesirable effects on the exchange rate, our model is constructed to be as simple
as possible to eliminate the presence of the aforementioned three channels of affection.
Thus, we exclude interest rates and forward currency exchanges, isolating ourselves from
the interest-rate channel and the signalling channel, respectively. Additionally, in order
to make the inventory adjustment channel non-functional, we also assume away -on the
part of the strategic traders- any motive other than profit maximization. That is to say, in
any period a strategic trader in our model chooses to be a buyer or a seller independently
from the size of her existing inventory (cash holding) of the foreign currency.
An important feature of our multi-period model is that whenever a strategic trader
buys a particular currency in any period, the average acquirement price of the cash she
has been holding in that currency changes, too. Computing the average acquirement
prices of her home and foreign currency holdings and conjecturing a market clearing
exchange rate in each period, each strategic trader can calculate her unit profits from
buying and selling the foreign currency. We assume that using these calculations, each
strategic trader first decides whether to buy or sell the foreign currency and observing
the simultaneously made decisions of all others, she next decides how much to trade.
Absolutely, these decisions cannot be made trivially. The market clearing exchange rate
conjectured by any strategic trader must depend on the decisions (trade orders) of all
other traders. Therefore, each strategic trader, while solving her optimization problems,
has to take into account her conjectures about the decisions of all other strategic traders
(along with her knowledge about the actions of the competitive traders and the central
bank). Here we should note that the conjectures of any two strategic traders about
the decision of a third strategic trader will always be the same because the strategic
traders will not be allowed to have and process private information like in the information
revelations models.
Definitely, the exclusion of private information from our model will simplify the task
of solving the strategic traders’ interdependent optimization problems to a great extent.
As a matter of fact, we will handle this task by formulating the decision making process
of the strategic traders in each period as a two-stage extensive form game with complete
and perfect information and then solving this game using the concept of subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium due to Selten (1965). Evidently, the players of this game are the
strategic traders in our model. In stage 1 the players non-cooperatively decide whether
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to buy or sell the foreign currency, and in stage 2 -after observing all of the decisions
made in stage 1- the players non-cooperatively determine their trade quantities. So, each
player’s complete strategy before the game starts must include her trade direction (the
plan whether to buy or sell the foreign currency) to be revealed in stage 1 along with
how much she will trade at each subgame in stage 2. Given all possible strategies of all
players, each player can then calculate her terminal payoff at each strategy profile taking
into account the associated market clearing level of the exchange rate.
A strategy profile in an extensive-form game is said to be a subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium (Selten, 1965) if it is an equilibrium a´ la Nash (1950) on every proper sub-
game of the original game. As we have assumed perfect information in our two-stage
game, we can solve it starting from each subgame in stage 2. That is, we can first
find -for each possible partition of strategic traders into non-exclusive sets of buyers and
sellers- a profile of trade quantities (stage 2 strategies) constituting a Nash equilibrium,
where none of the strategic traders has a strong incentive to unilaterally deviate from her
strategy. After replacing each subgame in stage 2 with the payoffs generated by a Nash
equilibrium play, we can then move back to stage 1 to check whether any partition of
strategic traders can be in Nash equilibrium. We show in Section 3 that the subgames in
stage 2 can always be solved in pure strategies: For any period and for any partition of
strategic traders a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium profile of trade quantities exists, and it
can be uniquely characterized (Proposition 1). But, unfortunately, due to the finiteness
of the game played in stage 1, a pure-strategy equilibrium of trade directions, leading
to an equilibrium partition of strategic traders, does not always exist, implying in turn
the possibility of non-existence of a pure-strategy subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of
our two-stage game (Proposition 2). Besides, in situations an equilibrium partition of
the strategic traders exists, it can be found only through extensive calculations, checking
the ‘no unilateral deviation’ condition for all strategic traders at all possible partitions
of strategic traders using their corresponding equilibrium trade quantities at these parti-
tions. Definitely, the lack of a characterization for the equilibrium partition of strategic
traders renders it impossible to study the equilibrium effects of the central bank’s inter-
ventions theoretically. Nevertheless, we are still able to pursue this comparative statics
exercise numerically in Section 4.
Our computer simulations show that the non-sterilized direct intervention of the
central bank may lead to a perverse effect on the exchange rate. Since the central
bank in our model aims to stabilize the exchange rate around a prespecified short-run
target, the desirable direction of trade from the viewpoint of the central bank requires
-under a backward-looking adjustment rule- buying (selling) foreign currency in any
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period if the equilibrium exchange rate was below (above) the target in the previous
period. We also know that the central bank pushes the exchange rate upwards when it
buys foreign currency. Oppositely, the central bank pulls the exchange rate downwards
when it sells foreign currency. Thus, the intervention always creates a negative effect
on the equilibrium profits of any strategic trader who trades in the direction desired by
the central bank, whereas it creates a positive effect on the equilibrium profits of any
strategic trader who trades in the opposite direction. In addition, both of these effects
become stronger when the scale of the intervention is larger. Given these facts, consider
a situation where some of the strategic traders in our model find it optimal to trade in
some period in the direction desired by the central bank while its intervention is at some
particular level. Further suppose that the contingent profits of these traders from trading
in the other direction are only slightly lower than their current profits, while for all the
remaining strategic traders in the market the gap between profits from buying and selling
the foreign currency is sufficiently large. For this situation, it is obvious that a slight
increase in the intervention of the central bank in the next period may induce the set of
strategic traders in our consideration to optimally switch from the trade direction desired
by the central bank to the opposite direction where the positive effect of intervention
has just become stronger, while the assumed limited change in intervention could only
yield negligible impacts on the trade orders of the remaining strategic traders due to their
assumed large profit gaps. Definitely, the effect of trade reversals by the strategic traders
in our consideration and the effect of the central bank’s slightly increased intervention
on the aggregate excess demand for foreign currency would work in opposite directions.
In situations where the former effect dominates the latter, the equilibrium exchange rate
would move in the direction undesired by the central bank, creating a perverse result of
intervention. Since this result arises in our model when some strategic traders switch
their trade direction, we call the underlying mechanism as ‘strategic trade switching’
channel, accordingly.
We believe that our study can be positioned within a strand of literature on market
microstructure, dealing with the process of trade and price determination under the
imperfect markets hypothesis. While some pioneering works of this literature are due
Kyle (1985), Lyons (1997), and Evans and Lyons (2002a, 2002b), the closest work to ours
is due Basu (2012), who also considers an oligopolistic model of competition involving
both strategic traders and competitive traders. His objective is entirely different though,
for he studies whether a central bank can devalue its currency without building up
foreign reserves. Apart from this difference, the oligopolistic exchange model of Basu
(2012) is unilateral, i.e., all strategic traders are assumed to be on the demand side of
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the market, whereas our model is bilateral -allowing the strategic traders to optimally
place themselves at any side of the market. Actually, a bilateral oligopolistic exchange
model was also addressed in the technical appendix of Basu (2009), an earlier version
of Basu (2012). However, in that model the set of buying dealers and the set of selling
dealers are exogenously given for the game played by the dealers, whereas in our model
these two sets are also determined in equilibrium.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents our model and Section
3 presents our theoretical results. Section 4 involves the results of computer simulations
illustrating the possibility of a perverse result of non-sterilized direct intervention. Fi-
nally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
We consider a multi-period model for a spot foreign exchange market in a two-country
world, involving the home country (H) and the foreign country (F). This foreign exchange
market contains an unspecified number of competitive traders -who take all prices as
given in their exchanges- and a total of n ≥ 2 strategic traders of home or foreign origin,
buying or selling the foreign currency (in exchange of the home currency). We assume
that the central bank of the home country (hereafter, simply the central bank) also trades
in the same market to limit the variability of the spot exchange rate around a prespecified
short-run target. The set of strategic traders is denoted by N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, and -for
convenience- the central bank is denoted by n+ 1.
Let pt be the exchange rate in period t; implying that one unit of the foreign currency
is bought and sold at pt units of the home currency. For simplicity, let the spread between
buy and sell prices of currencies be zero in each period. Also, let the non-negative real
numbers qBi,t and q
S
i,t respectively denote the quantity of the foreign currency bought and
the quantity of the foreign currency sold by trader i in period t.
The strategic traders and the central bank in the market have non-negative cash
holdings in both home and foreign currencies.3 For any trader i ∈ N ∪ {n+ 1}, let MHi,t
and MFi,t respectively denote her cash holdings in the home and the foreign currency.
Assuming that initial cash holdings MHi,0 and M
F
i,0 of trader i are given, we can calculate
her cash holdings in each period t ≥ 1 as follows:
MHi,t = M
H
i,t−1 − (qBi,t − qSi,t) pt, (1)
3The same is true for the competitive traders, as well. We omit their cash holdings for they will not
be relevant for our results.
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and
MFi,t = M
F
i,t−1 + q
B
i,t − qSi,t. (2)
While the strategic traders and the central bank exchange currencies and change their
cash balances in each period, the average acquirement prices of these balances also
change. Let pHi,t denote for trader i the average acquirement price of the home cur-
rency (in terms of the home currency) between periods 0 and t, implying that for each
unit of home currency agent i is holding, he or she has sold until the end of period t
exactly 1/pHi,t units of the foreign currency on average. Likewise, let p
F
i,t denote for trader
i the average acquirement price of the foreign currency (in terms of the home currency)
between periods 0 and t, implying that for each unit of the foreign currency agent i is
holding, he or she has sold until the end of period t exactly pFi,t units of the home cur-
rency on average. Assuming that pHi,0 and p
F
i,0 are given at the beginning of period 1, the
average acquirement price of home (foreign) currency holdings of trader i ∈ N ∪{n+ 1}
can be obtained in each period t by calculating the quantity-weighted average of the
average acquirement price of her home (foreign) currency holdings in period t − 1 and
the purchase price of her home (foreign) currency acquired in period t as follows:
pHi,t =
MHi,t−1p
H
i,t−1 + max(0,M
H
i,t −MHi,t−1)pt
MHi,t−1 + max(0,M
H
i,t −MHi,t−1)
, (3)
and
pFi,t =
MFi,t−1p
F
i,t−1 + max(0,M
F
i,t −MFi,t−1)pt
MFi,t + max(0,M
F
i,t −MFi,t−1)
. (4)
Using these average acquirement price calculations, each strategic trader can decide
whether to buy or sell the foreign currency in any period, as we will later show. (Since
the central bank, player n+ 1, in our model will have no intention to earn profit through
its interventions, we will not need to calculate pHn+1,t or p
F
n+1,t. On the other hand, we will
need to calculate the cash holdings of the central bank in the home and foreign currencies,
MHn+1,t and M
F
n+1,t respectively, to check in our simulations whether its currency trades
are feasible.)
For the competitive traders as a whole, the supply and demand relationships for the
foreign currency are respectively given by the following two functions:
s(pt) = a+ cpt, (5)
d(pt) = b− pt, (6)
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where a, b, c are positive real numbers. We assume b > a to ensure that the equilibrium
exchange rate would be positive even when the strategic traders and the central bank
did not trade. Since, we consider a short-run model in our paper, we exclude the effect
of any fundamentals (other than the central bank’s intervention) in the above supply
and demand functions as well as in the decisions of the strategic traders.
Thus, we have completed to describe the basic structures of our model. We can now
consider the clearing of the foreign exchange market. Given equations (5) and (6), we
can define the period-t excess supply of the competitive traders as
ψ(pt) = s(pt)− d(pt) = a− b+ (c+ 1)pt. (7)
Also, we can denote by qEDn+1,t = q
B
n+1,t− qSn+1,t the central bank’s period-t excess demand
for the foreign currency. Then, in any period t the clearing of the foreign exchange
market implies that the excess demand for the foreign currency by the non-competitive
traders (the central bank and the strategic traders) must be equal to the excess supply
of the foreign currency by the competitive traders:
qEDn+1,t +
n∑
i=1
(qBi,t − qSi,t) = ψ(pt). (8)
To solve for the exchange rate pt in the above equality, we define the function
ξ(x) = ψ−1(x) =
b− a+ x
c+ 1
(9)
for every x ≥ 0, leading to the solution
pt =
b− a+ qEDn+1,t +
∑n
i=1(q
B
i,t − qSi,t)
c+ 1
. (10)
In the above equation the parameters a, b, and c are always fixed. In each period t, the
central bank, i.e. trader n + 1, can control the excess demand variable qEDn+1,t. On the
other hand, each strategic trader i ∈ N can control her foreign currency purchase and
sale, qBi,t and q
S
i,t, respectively.
At this stage we will not be interested in how the central bank will vary its control
variable qEDn+1,t. Moreover, we will assume that the variable q
ED
n+1,t and the parameters a, b,
and c are known by, and exogenously given to, all strategic traders. Having said this, we
are ready to describe the decision problem faced by each strategic trader. Let NBt denote
the set of strategic traders who buy the foreign currency in period t. Similarly, let NSt
denote the set of strategic traders who sell the foreign currency in period t. Obviously,
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NBt ∪ NSt = N . Moreover, NBt ∩ NSt = ∅, each strategic trader finds either selling or
buying more profitable. This implies for all i ∈ NBt we have qSi,t = 0 (no buying dealer
sells the foreign currency in the same period) and for all i ∈ NSt we have qBi,t = 0 (no
selling dealer buys the foreign currency in the same period). In the zero-probability event
that buying and selling the foreign currency are equally profitable for a strategic trader,
we will allow this trader to arbitrarily determine whether she will buy or sell.
Now we will define the profit of each buyer and each seller, by treating the sets NBt
and NSt as already determined. Eventually, these two sets will be determined in the
equilibrium of our game, as will be shown later. So, given the sets of strategic buyers
and sellers NBt and N
S
t , and their purchases and sales of the foreign currency, (q
B
j,t)j∈NBt ,
and (qSl,t)l∈NSt , the profit (measured in the home currency) of each strategic buyer i ∈ NBt
expected from buying the foreign currency can be calculated as
piBi,t((q
B
j,t)j∈NBt , (q
S
l,t)l∈NSt )
= pHi,t−1 q
B
i,t − pt qBi,t
=
(
(c+ 1)pHi,t−1 − b+ a− qEDn+1,t −
∑
j∈NBt q
B
j,t +
∑
l∈NSt q
S
l,t
c+ 1
)
qBi,t. (11)
Likewise, for each strategic seller k ∈ NSt , the profit (measured in the home currency)
expected from selling the foreign currency can be calculated as
piSk ((q
B
j,t)j∈NBt , (q
S
l,t)l∈NSt )
= ptq
S
k,t − pFk,t−1qSk,t
=
(−(c+ 1)pFk,t−1 + b− a+ qEDn+1,t +∑j∈NBt qBj,t −∑l∈NSt qSl,t
c+ 1
)
qSk,t. (12)
Note that each strategic buyer i ∈ NBt in period t seeks a non-negative quantity of
purchase qBi,t that is maximizing (11) and also feasible, i.e., that can be bought using her
beginning-of-period cash holdings in the home currency MHi,t−1. Similarly, each strategic
seller k ∈ NSt in period t seeks a non-negative quantity of sale qSk,t that is maximizing
(12) and also feasible, i.e., that does not exceed her beginning-of-period cash holdings
in the foreign currency MFi,t−1. These two sets of objectives are interdependent because
of a common variable, pt, entering both (11) and (12). That is to say, the choice of
qBi,t affects, through its influence on pt, the choice of q
S
i,t, and vice versa. This implies
that each strategic trader, when determining her choice of trade order, has to take into
account the choices of all other strategic traders.
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For convenience, we represent the decision problems of the strategic traders in each
period using a two-stage extensive form game with complete and perfect information.
Evidently, the players of this game are the strategic traders in our model. In stage
1, each player non-cooperatively decides whether to buy or sell the foreign currency.
The decisions of all players defines a partition of them into non-exclusive sets of buyers
and sellers. In stage 2, after observing this partition, each player determines her trade
quantity. So, each player’s complete strategy before the game starts involves her trade
direction in stage 1, i.e., the plan whether to buy or sell foreign currency, along with how
much she will trade at any subgame played in stage 2. It is clear that using her profits
from buying and selling the foreign currency each player can then calculate her terminal
payoffs at each strategy profile of the players using equations (11) and (12), taking into
account the corresponding market clearing level of the exchange rate.
A strategy profile in an extensive-form game is said to be a subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium when it is a Nash equilibrium on every proper subgame of the original game.
Thanks to our perfect information assumption, implying that the players observe at the
beginning of stage 2 all decisions made in stage 1, we can solve our game starting from
each subgame in stage 2.
Stage 2: In this stage, we seek -for each possible partition of strategic traders into non-
exclusive sets of buyers and sellers- a strategy profile of trade quantities constituting a
Nash equilibrium, where none of the strategic traders has a strong incentive to unilater-
ally deviate from her strategy. Formally, we say that given any partition {NBt , NSt } of
N , the strategy profile
(
(q∗Bj,t )j∈NBt , (q
∗S
l,t )l∈NSt
)
is a Nash equilibrium if the following two
conditions hold:
i) For all i ∈ NBt and for all qBi,t ∈ [0,MHi,t−1]
piBi,t
(
(q∗Bj,t )j∈NBt , (q
∗S
l,t )l∈NSt
)
≥ piBi,t
(
qBi,t, (q
∗B
j,t )j∈NBt \{i}, (q
∗S
l,t )l∈NSt
)
. (13)
ii) For all k ∈ NSt and for all qSk,t ∈ [0,MFi,t−1]
piSk,t
(
(q∗Bj,t )j∈NBt , (q
∗S
l,t )l∈NSt
)
≥ piSk,t
(
(q∗Bj,t )j∈NBt , q
S
k,t, (q
∗S
l,t )l∈NSt \{k}
)
. (14)
Above, condition (i) states that each strategic buyer i finds the purchase strategy
q∗Bi,t ∈ [0,MHi,t−1] profit maximizing if all other buyers and all sellers stick to their strate-
gies in the profile
(
(q∗Bj,t )j∈NBt \{i}, (q
∗S
l,t )l∈NSt
)
. Likewise, condition (ii) states that each
strategic seller k finds the sale strategy q∗Sk,t ∈ [0,MFk,t−1] profit maximizing if all other
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sellers and all buyers stick to their strategies in the profile
(
(q∗Bj,t )j∈NBt , (q
∗S
l,t )l∈NSt \{k}
)
.
In short, a strategy profile of trade quantities is a Nash equilibrium if no buyer or seller
has a strict incentive for unilateral deviation (to another trade quantity). Since the sets
NBt and N
S
t partition the set of strategic traders N and since we have assumed that
N is constant, we can denote the Nash equilibrium purchase of each buyer i ∈ NBt by
q∗Bi,t (N
B
t ) and the Nash equilibrium sale of each seller k ∈ NSt by q∗Si,t (NSt ), for simplicity.
Now, we can go back to stage 1.
Stage 1: We can replace each subgame in stage 2 with the payoffs generated by a Nash
equilibrium play, and check whether any partition of the strategic traders, generated by
the strategy profile of the players in stage 1, can be in Nash equilibrium. Formally, we
say that the partition {N∗Bt , N∗St } is a Nash equilibrium partition if the following two
conditions hold:
i) For all i ∈ N∗Bt
piBi,t
(
(q∗Bj,t (N
∗B
t ))j∈N∗Bt , (q
∗S
l,t (N
∗S
t ))l∈N∗St
)
≥
piSi,t
(
(q∗Bj,t (N
∗B
t \ {i}))j∈N∗Bt \{i}, (q∗Sl,t (N∗St ∪ {i}))l∈N∗St ∪{i}
)
. (15)
ii) For all k ∈ N∗St
piSk,t
(
(q∗Bj,t (N
∗B
t ))j∈N∗Bt , (q
∗S
l,t (N
∗S
t ))l∈N∗St
)
≥
piBk,t
(
(q∗Bj,t (N
∗B
t ∪ {i}))j∈N∗Bt ∪{i}, (q∗Sl,t (N∗St \ {i}))l∈N∗St \{i}
)
. (16)
If a partition is in Nash equilibrium in any period, every strategic trader must be
satisfied with her decision regarding whether to become a buyer or seller in that period,
given the decisions of the others. Accordingly, the first condition above requires that no
strategic buyer can be strictly better off by acting like a strategic seller and choosing
the optimal quantity to sell. Conversely, the second condition requires that no strategic
seller can be strictly better off by acting like a strategic buyer and choosing the optimal
quantity to buy.
Having described the equilibrium in each stage of our extensive-form game, we can
say that a profile of buying/selling decisions yielding the partition {N∗Bt , N∗St } and
a profile of trade quantities
(
q∗Bj,t (N
B
t ))j∈NBt , (q
∗S
l,t (N
S
t ))l∈NSt
)
defined for each possible
partition {NBt , NSt } together constitute a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of our
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two-stage game if:
(i) for each partition {NBt , NSt }, the strategy profile
(
q∗Bj,t (N
B
t ))j∈NBt , (q
∗S
l,t (N
S
t ))l∈NSt
)
is
in Nash equilibrium, and
ii) the partition {N∗Bt , N∗St } is in Nash equilibrium.
In the next section, we will investigate whether our game is solvable by the notion of
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
3 Theoretical Results
Below we first characterize the equilibrium of each subgame played in the second stage
of our foreign exchange game.
Proposition 1. For any partition of strategic traders, {NBt , NSt }, a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium profile of trade quantities always exists and this equilibrium along with the
corresponding market clearing price is uniquely characterized by (17-(19):
q∗Bi,t =
−b+ a− qEDn+1,t
n+ 1
+
c+ 1
n+ 1
npHi,t−1 − ∑
j∈NBt \{i}
pHj,t−1 −
∑
l∈NSt
pFl,t−1
, ∀i ∈ NBt (17)
q∗Sk,t =
b− a+ qEDn+1,t
n+ 1
− c+ 1
n+ 1
npFk,t−1 − ∑
j∈NBt
pHj,t−1 −
∑
l∈NSt \{k}
pFl,t−1
, ∀k ∈ NSt (18)
p∗t =
1
n+ 1
(
b− a+ qEDn+1,t
c+ 1
)
+
1
n+ 1
∑
i∈NBt
pHi,t−1 +
∑
k∈NSt
pFk,t−1
 . (19)
Proof. See Appendix.
Note that by replacing the arbitrary partition {NBt , NSt } in equations (17)-(19)
of Proposition 1 with the equilibrium partition {N∗Bt , N∗St }, whenever it exists, we
can calculate the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of our two-stage game and the
corresponding market clearing exchange rate. Also recall that we can search for the
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equilibrium partition {N∗Bt , N∗St } in stage 1 of our game, by checking for each partition
{NBt , NSt } the inequality conditions (15) and (16) using the Nash equilibrium profile
of trade quantities wherever necessary. However, as it is well known, a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium may not exist in games with a finite number of players and strategies.
Apparently, this raises a red flag for the game played in stage 1, where the number
of players is finite and each player has a finite number of strategies, namely the two
strategies of ‘committing to buy the foreign currency in stage 2’ and ‘committing to sell
the foreign currency in stage 2’. Our next result shows that our concern in that regard
is not unfounded; for some specifications of our model no partition of strategic traders
can be an equilibrium, directly implying that for these cases no subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium can exist in pure strategies.4
Proposition 2. For some settings of our model, the corresponding two-stage foreign
exchange game has no subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof. See Appendix.
Unfortunately, we are facing at this point not only the possibility of non-existence
of a pure-strategy equilibrium partition of strategic traders but also the impossibility of
characterizing a closed-form solution for the pure-strategy equilibrium partition when-
ever it exists. Thus, we are unable to make comparative statics on our theoretical results.
To shed more light on this matter, consider the following thought experiment where we
change the foreign currency purchase of the central bank to see its impact on the equilib-
rium exchange rate. For convenience, suppose that a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
exists before this experiment, allowing us to change the partition {NBt , NSt } with the
equilibrium partition {N∗Bt , N∗St } in equations (17)-(19). Now, consider an increase in
the central bank’s period-t excess demand for the foreign currency q¯EDn+1,t by one unit. This
would increase up the value of the first parenthesis in equation (19) by 1/[(n+ 1)(c+ 1)]
units. But, we are unable to predict whether or how the assumed unit change in q¯EDn+1,t
4The negative result about the existence of equilibrium partitions only concerns the equilibrium in
pure strategies where each player is restricted to choose to be either a buyer or a seller with probability
one. If we had allowed mixed (non-pure) strategies we would always have an equilibrium thanks to the
existence result of Nash (1950). In such a game, each strategic player i ∈ N would believe that every
other player would be a buyer (of the foreign currency) with some probability vi ∈ [0, 1] and a seller
with probability 1− vi. Since we can easily find, as illustrated in the next section, some model settings
which will lead to the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium partition of the strategic traders, we have
abstained in this section from characterizing the mixed strategy equilibrium partition(s).
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would impact on the equilibrium partition {N∗Bt , N∗St } (or on its very existence), and
consequently on the terms inside the second parenthesis in equation (19). In short, our
theoretical results do not allow us to analytically study the effects of non-sterilized direct
interventions of the central bank on the exchange rate. Nevertheless, we will be able to
conduct this analysis numerically in Section 4.
4 Simulation Results
Here, we simulate our model to study the response of its equilibrium to non-sterilized
direct interventions of the central bank. (We conduct our computations using GAUSS
Software Version 3.2.34 [Aptech Systems, 1998]. The source code of our simulation
program is available upon request.)
For our simulations, we consider a market with three strategic traders, i.e., n = 3.
Accordingly, the set of non-competitive traders becomes N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, with trader 4
denoting the central bank. We also assume that all non-competitive traders have the
same initial cash holdings, satisfying MHi,0 = 100 and M
F
i,0 = 20 for i = 1, 2, 3, 4. The
central bank, i.e., trader 4, intervenes to the market only directly, by buying or selling
the foreign currency. However, unlike the strategic traders, the central bank has no
intention to achieve any monetary gain through currency trade. It trades the foreign
currency only to limit the variability of the exchange rate around a prespecified short-
run target. Formally, the central bank trades in each period t ≥ 1 (or controls its excess
demand q∗ED4,t ) according to a backward-looking rule given by
q∗ED4,t = (P¯ − p∗t−1)Q¯, (20)
where p∗t−1 is the equilibrium exchange rate in period t−1, P¯ is a prespecified (short-run)
target for the equilibrium exchange rate, and Q¯ > 0 is a parameter affecting the size of
intervention. This rule implies that the central bank buys (sells) the foreign currency in
period t if and only if the equilibrium exchange rate observed in period t − 1 is below
(above) the target.
Model Settings: We will simulate our model for 50 consecutive periods. We assume
that the foreign currency supply and demand functions of the competitive traders are
parameterized by a = 4, b = 13.9, and c = 1.9. On the other hand, the average
acquirement price of cash holdings of the strategic traders are as in Table 1.
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Table 1.
pH1,0 p
H
2,0 p
H
3,0 p
F
1,0 p
F
2,0 p
F
3,0
3.5500 3.4500 3.5000 3.5000 3.4200 3.4400
We set the central bank’s target exchange rate P¯ to 3.5000 and vary the intervention
parameter Q¯ inside the set {1, 4, 7, 10, 13, 16}. Note that each value of Q¯ will define
along with all other parameters a distinct simulation of our model lasting for 50 periods.
For all six values of Q¯, we have found that an equilibrium partition of strategic traders
{NB∗t , NS∗t } exists in all 50 periods. Inserting the calculated equilibrium partition into
equations (17)-(19), we have computed in each period the market clearing exchange rate
and the equilibrium trades of the strategic traders. (In any period t, where there were
two or more equilibrium partitions, we selected the one that minimized the difference
between the market clearing exchange rates in period t and t − 1.) Hereafter, we will
call the market clearing exchange rate, calculated at the subgame-perfect equilibrium of
our game, as the equilibrium exchange rate simply.
In Figure 1 below, we plot the equilibrium exchange rate p∗t for the six values of Q¯.
We should note that in all simulations, the central bank starts to intervene in period 1.
Therefore, for period 0, we set the parameter Q¯ to 0, leading to an equilibrium exchange
rate of p∗0 = 3.4709. Accordingly, in all six panels of Figure 1 the graph of p
∗
t starts at the
point (0, 3.4709). Additional observations about Figure 1 are in order. First, when the
size of Q¯ is sufficiently low as in panels (a)-(d), the equilibrium exchange rate fluctuates
converging to a steady-state level, and otherwise the equilibrium exchange rate fluctuates
without convergence as in panels (e)-(f). Also, as we note from panels (a)-(d), the speed
of convergence is decreasing in the size of Q¯. Our second observation, obtained from
panels (a)-(d), is that the steady-state level of the equilibrium exchange rate may differ
from the central bank’s target rate, which could in fact never be attained. On the other
hand, whenever Q¯ becomes quite high as in panel (f) of Figure 1, the central bank can
achieve its target, but only temporarily while the equilibrium exchange rate moves on a
non-converging oscillatory path. The first and second observations might simply imply
that the central bank, while planning to conduct a non-sterilized intervention, may face a
dilemma between never achieving its target and creating huge exchange rate fluctuations
around its target.
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Figure 1. The Time Path of the Equilibrium Exchange Rate
for Different Intervention Strengths
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We should also note that in panels (a)-(e) of Figure 1 the equilibrium exchange rate
p∗t never exceeds the target rate, P¯ = 3.5000. For these panels, the right hand side
of equation (20) would always become positive, requiring the central bank to buy the
foreign currency in each of the 50 simulation periods. Despite that, the equilibrium
exchange rate p∗t in panels (b) and (e) of Figure 1 is found to fall below its starting
level, p∗0 = 3.4710, in some periods. To explain the reason of this perverse result, we
will focus on panel (b) and report in Table 2 the equilibrium exchange rate and the
central bank’s excess demand for the foreign currency in some selected periods. As
is evident from the first two rows of this table, the foreign currency purchase of the
central bank has increased by 0.1164 units in period 1, leading to a decrease in the
equilibrium exchange rate by 50 pips (from 3.4710 to 3.4660). In all subsequent periods
the equilibrium exchange rate positively responds to the central bank’s purchases, in line
with equation (20). Apparently, the perverse result observed in period 1 is so large that
the steady state level of the equilibrium exchange rate, which is reached around period
7 at a value of 3.4672, is not only lower than the target exchange rate of 3.5000 but also
the pre-intervention level of p∗0 = 3.4710.
Table 2.
t q∗ED4,t+1 p
∗
t
0 0 3.4710
1 0.1164 3.4660
2 0.1361 3.4677
3 0.1293 3.4671
4 0.1316 3.4673
5 0.1308 3.4672
6 0.1311 3.4672
7 0.1310 3.4672
... ... ...
50 0.1310 3.4672
What we have just illustrated above points to a more general puzzle where the central
bank, aiming to stabilize the equilibrium exchange rate around a target by non-sterilized
direct intervention, may instead unintentionally move it away from the target like in
panel (b) of Figure 1, if not leading to an unstable fluctuation as in panels (e) and (f).
Surely, such perverse results can not arise in a perfectly competitive market defined by
conventional supply and demand functions. But, the exchange market we model in our
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paper is not perfectly competitive, and neither are the actual foreign exchange markets
to the best of our observation. It is entirely the imperfection of our exchange market, i.e.,
the existence of foreign exchange dealers that can strategically act against each other
and against the central bank, that drives the illustrated perverse response. To shed
more light upon this, we will plot in Figure 2 the time paths of the four non-competitive
traders’ equilibrium excess demands for the foreign currency (i.e., q∗EDi,t = q
∗B
i,t − q∗Si,t for
i = 1, . . . , 4 and t = 0, . . . , 50) corresponding to the simulation in panel (b).
Figure 2. Non-Competitive Traders’ Equilibrium Excess Demands
for the Foreign Currency
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In the above figure we can immediately observe that player 1 (on the blue curve)
is always a buyer of the foreign currency while player 2 (on the red curve) is always a
seller. On the other hand, the third player (on the green curve), who buys the foreign
currency in period 0 where there exists no intervention (q∗ED4,0 = 0), decides to be a seller
from period 1 onwards, where the central bank (on the orange curve) starts to directly
intervene. To have a closer look at the changes in these four curves in period 1, we report
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in Table 3 the data drawn from Figure 2 for periods 0 and 1, along with the total excess
demand for the foreign currency by the non-competitive traders. Here, we observe that
when the central bank starts to intervene in period 1 by purchasing 0.1164 units of the
foreign currency, the total excess demand of the non-competitive traders falls down from
the pre-intervention level of 0.1657 units to 0.1513 units, entirely because of player 3’s
switching from buying to selling. On the other hand, the central bank’s intervention has
no direct influence on the excess supply of the competitive traders, i.e., the right hand-
side of the market clearing condition (8). Thus, the fall in the total excess demand of the
non-competitive traders for the foreign currency caused by the central bank’s intervention
leads to a reduction in the aggregate excess demand before the adjustment of exchange
rate occurs, and consequently this reduction pushes down the market clearing exchange
rate of period 1, p∗1, to a level lower than the pre-intervention rate of p
∗
0.
Table 3.
t q∗ED1,t q
∗ED
2,t q
∗ED
3,t q
∗ED
4,t
∑4
i=1 q
∗ED
i,t
0 0.2292 -0.1478 0.0842 0.0000 0.1657
1 0.2436 -0.1334 -0.0753 0.1164 0.1513
The reason why in Figure 2 the third player -and only this player- changes the di-
rection of trade can be understood by re-inspecting Table 1, where we observe that
the average acquirement prices of both home and foreign currency holdings are initially
higher for player 1, and lower for player 2, than the target exchange rate of 3.5000 and
also the period-0 equilibrium exchange rate of p∗0 = 3.4709. This table suggests that as
long as the equilibrium exchange rate does not exceed the target rate, player 1 would
prefer to be a buyer of the foreign currency whereas player 2 would prefer to be a seller.
That is why the trade directions of these two players never change in any simulation
periods. For player 3, however, the situation is not the same. The average acquirement
price of the home currency pH3,0 for player 3 is just equal to the central bank’s target
rate of 3.5000, while the average acquirement price of the foreign currency pF3,0 = 3.4400
is below the pre-intervention rate of p∗0 = 3.4709. One can check that in period 0 the
unit profits from buying and selling the foreign currency are very close for player 3, and
therefore in period 1 the profits of this player and the equilibrium exchange rate become
extremely sensitive to the intervention of the central bank. In period 0, where there
is no intervention, player 3 finds it optimal to buy the foreign currency, because if she
chooses to become a seller instead, the equilibrium price would not be sufficiently high
to warrant her switching from buying to selling. However, when the foreign currency
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purchase of the central bank drastically rises by q∗ED4,1 = 0.1164 units in period 1, there
arises an opportunity for player 3 to switch from buying to selling the foreign currency
without reducing the equilibrium exchange rate, and the profitability of selling relative
to buying, too much. To put it in a different way, the central bank’s purchases of the
foreign currency in period 1 substitute for player 3’s purchases of the foreign currency
in period 0. So, the central bank’s trading in period 1 almost like player 3 of the pre-
vious period, makes it possible for player 3 to act in period 1 as if she is a new player.
Resultingly, she optimally switches from buying to selling the foreign currency since she
finds that the repercussions of this switching on the equilibrium price and consequently
on her profits would be unintentionally compensated by the central bank’s purchases of
the foreign currency.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered a multi-period model for a spot foreign exchange
market that involves a finite number of strategic traders, an unspecified number of com-
petitive traders, and a central bank with the goal to stabilize the exchange rate around a
prespecified (short-run) target. The key feature of this market is that prices and quanti-
ties are determined together, unlike in rational expectations models where the quantity
decisions are conditional on prices. Each period of our model involves a two-stage game
(with complete and perfect information) played by the strategic traders. In stage 1 of
this game, each strategic trader non-cooperatively commits to whether to buy or sell
the foreign currency, and in stage 2, after observing the stage 1 commitments of all
strategic traders, each strategic trader non-cooperatively decides how much to trade in
the direction she determined in stage 1. We have showed that a meaningful solution
(a pure-strategy subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium) of this game may not always exist
and whenever it exists it cannot be characterized in a closed form. Thus, we have made
some numerical settings for the variables and parameters in our model to make our game
solvable, and calculated the equilibrium solution for different strengths of interventions
using a computer program. Our calculations have showed that non-sterilized direct inter-
ventions of the central bank to this market may yield perverse effects on the equilibrium
(spot) exchange rate. The underlying reason for this puzzle is entirely strategic: As the
intervention of the central bank moves the equilibrium exchange rate towards the target,
the profits of strategic traders from buying and selling the foreign currency change. As
a matter of fact, an increase in the intervention of the central bank, through its effect on
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the equilibrium exchange rate, decreases the profits of the strategic traders who trade in
the direction targeted by the central bank, while increasing the profits of those trading
in the other direction. If, at some level of intervention, there are some strategic traders
for whom these two profits are sufficiently close to each other and if these traders have
found it optimal to trade in the direction targeted by the central bank, then even a
slight increase in the intervention of the central bank may unintentionally lead these
traders to optimally switch their trading to the opposite direction. These trade reversals
would destabilize the aggregate excess demand for foreign currency and resultingly move
the equilibrium exchange rate away from the targeted level. This perverse result along
with the previous results of Dominguez and Frankel (1993) and Bhattacharya and Weller
(1997) implies that interventions may yield perverse responses regardless whether they
are sterilized or non-sterilized.
Besides its simplicity, our model has several limitations, as well. First of all, we have
assumed that each strategic trader has complete information about the acquirement
prices of the home and foreign currency balances of all other strategic traders. This
assumption may require all strategic traders to observe or guess the currency transactions
of all other traders, which may be impossible or very difficult since these transactions
are officially anonymous. However, we should note that it is possible to alleviate this
drawback of our model by introducing incomplete information on the part of strategic
traders, though at the expense of complicating the computations we should make to solve
our two-stage game.
Another drawback of our model is that the strategic traders are assumed to trade in
each period their equilibrium orders. While this assumption also necessitates common
knowledge about the conjectures of each strategic trader about all other strategic traders’
strategies, in reality the formation of common knowledge, and consequently the formation
of an equilibrium, may take long periods of time. Thus, the strategic traders may
actually trade in some periods non-equilibrium quantities and even trade in directions
unsupported by any equilibria.
In addition, the two-stage extensive form game played by the spot market dealers in
each period may be an inadequate representation of the actual trading process taking
place in the foreign exchange markets. That is, each dealer, instead of determining her
trade direction and trade quantity sequentially like in our model, might determine these
two variables simultaneously like in reality, leading to a single-stage game. However, we
should also note that the normal-form representation of our extensive-form game would
actually allow us to study the Nash equilibrium of a such a single-stage game at the
expense of some additional computational costs.
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Furthermore, our model limits the definition of profits from trading foreign currency
by disregarding the strategic traders’ expectations about the profitability of future trades.
For example, a strategic trader’s unit profits from buying the foreign currency in our
model is for simplicity defined to be the average acquirement price of home currency
holdings used for the transaction net of the price (exchange rate) paid for a unit foreign
currency. We could have alternatively defined this unit profit as the expected future
worth of a unit foreign currency net of its current price. Clearly, this definition would
require -under some rationality assumptions- the strategic traders to solve their future
optimization problems in advance in order to make predictions about the future exchange
rates. While we admit that extending our model in this direction may be fruitful, whether
this forward-looking alternative definition or our current definition of unit profits is more
realistic is entirely a behavioral question which is beyond the scope of this paper.
It should be apparent that neither of the limitations discussed above is responsible
for the perverse result of intervention. Irrespective of whether strategic traders play their
complete or incomplete information equilibrium or non-equilibrium strategies or play a
two-stage game or single-stage game, and irrespective of the definition of unit profits
from buying and selling the foreign currency, perverse responses to the central bank’s
interventions may arise if at the prevailing exchange rate some sufficiently large strategic
traders in the market find themselves, with respect to their profit calculations, right at
the edge of switching their trades to the direction untargeted by the central bank.
Future research may extend our work to study whether perverse responses may also
arise when the central bank intervenes not (only) directly (through exchanges of the
foreign currency) but (also) indirectly, say, by controlling the nominal interest rate of the
domestic financial assets, so as to influence the excess demand for the foreign currency.
Finally, we believe that the findings in our paper not only add to our understanding
of how the imperfect exchange markets operate in the presence of non-sterilized inter-
ventions but also may provide some guidance for monetary authorities. Needless to say,
correctly anticipating when a perverse result of intervention would arise might not be
an easy or even achievable task as it would require the central bank to always closely
watch and be aware of officially anonymous and also extremely frequent transactions
of strategic traders in the market, to estimate their contingent profits from buying or
selling the foreign currency so as to correctly guess their trade orders. Thus, central
banks might not be always successful in conducting a non-sterilized intervention without
creating some perverse effects on the exchange rate. Since similar perverse results are
known to arise under a sterilized intervention as well, our findings may unintentionally
contribute to a debate whether it would not be better -in most cases- for the central
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bank not to conduct interventions in any form and just leave the determination of the
foreign exchange rate to market makers.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. For any trader i ∈ NBt the profit from buying the foreign
currency can be written as
piBi,t(N
B
t , N
S
t ) = p
H
i,t−1 q
B
i,t − ptqBi,t (21)
=
(
(c+ 1)pHi,t−1 − b+ a− qEDn+1,t −
∑
j∈NBt q
B
j,t +
∑
l∈NSt q
S
l,t
c+ 1
)
qBi,t.
The first order condition for profit maximization implies
∂
∂qBi,t
piBi,t(N
B
t , N
S
t ) =
(c+ 1)pHi,t−1 − b+ a− qEDn+1,t −
∑
j∈NBt \{i} q
B
j,t +
∑
l∈NSt q
S
l,t
c+ 1
− 2q
B
i,t
c+ 1
= 0. (22)
It follows that for any i, j ∈ NBt we have
(c+ 1)[pHi,t−1 − pHj,t−1]− (qBj,t − qBi,t) = 2(qBi,t − qBj,t) (23)
or
qBj,t = q
B
i,t − (c+ 1)[pHi,t−1 − pHj,t−1]. (24)
Thus, we have∑
j∈NBt \{i}
qBj,t = (|NBt | − 1)qBi,t − (|NBt | − 1)(c+ 1)pHi,t−1 + (c+ 1)
∑
j∈NBt \{i}
pHj,t−1 (25)
implying∑
j∈NBt
qBj,t = |NBt |qBi,t − (|NBt | − 1)(c+ 1)pHi,t−1 + (c+ 1)
∑
j∈NBt \{i}
pHj,t−1. (26)
Likewise, for any trader k ∈ NSt , the profit from selling the foreign currency equals
piSk (N
B
t , N
S
t ) = ptq
S
k,t − pFk,t−1qSk,t (27)
=
(−(c+ 1)pFk,t−1 + b− a+ qEDn+1,t +∑j∈NBt qBj,t −∑l∈NSt qSl,t
c+ 1
)
qSk,t.
The first order condition for profit maximization implies
∂
∂qSk,t
piSk (N
B
t , N
S
t ) =
−(c+ 1)pFk,t−1 + b− a+ qEDn+1,t +
∑
j∈NBt q
B
j,t −
∑
l∈NSt \{k} q
S
l,t
c+ 1
− 2q
S
k,t
c+ 1
= 0. (28)
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It follows that for any k, l ∈ NSt we have
−(c+ 1)(pFk,t−1 − pFl,t−1)− (qSl,t − qSk,t) = 2(qSk,t − qSl,t) (29)
or
qSl,t = q
S
k,t + (c+ 1)(p
F
k,t−1 − pFl,t−1). (30)
Thus, we have∑
l∈NSt \{k}
qSl,t = (|NSt | − 1)qSk,t + (|NSt | − 1)(c+ 1)pFk,t−1 − (c+ 1)
∑
l∈NSt \{k}
pFl,t−1, (31)
implying∑
l∈NSt
qSl,t = |NSt |qSk,t + (|NSt | − 1)(c+ 1)pFk,t−1 − (c+ 1)
∑
l∈NSt \{k}
pFl,t−1. (32)
Then, the first-order conditions
(c+ 1)pHi,t−1 − b+ a− qEDn+1,t −
∑
j∈NBt \{i}
qBj,t +
∑
l∈NSt
qSl,t − 2qBi,t = 0 (33)
and
−(c+ 1)pFk,t−1 + b− a+ qEDn+1,t +
∑
j∈NBt
qBj,t −
∑
l∈NSt \{k}
qSl,t − 2qSk,t = 0 (34)
imply
2qBi,t = (c+ 1)p
H
i,t−1 − b+ a− qEDn+1,t
−
(|NBt | − 1)qBi,t − (|NBt | − 1)(c+ 1)pHi,t−1 + (c+ 1) ∑
j∈NBt \{i}
pHj,t−1

+|NSt |qSk,t + (|NSt | − 1)(c+ 1)pFk,t−1 − (c+ 1)
∑
l∈NSt \{k}
pFl,t−1 (35)
and
2qSk,t = −(c+ 1)pFk,t−1 + b− a+ qEDn+1,t +
+
|NBt |qBi,t − (|NBt | − 1)(c+ 1)pHi,t−1 + (c+ 1) ∑
j∈NBt \{i}
pHj,t−1

−
(|NSt | − 1)qSk,t + (|NSt | − 1)(c+ 1)pFk,t−1 − (c+ 1) ∑
l∈NSt \{k}
pFl,t−1
(36)
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further implying
qBi,t =
1
|NBt |+ 1
(
(c+ 1)pHi,t−1 − b+ a− qEDn+1,t
)
− c+ 1|NBt |+ 1
(−(|NBt | − 1)pHi,t−1 − (|NSt | − 1)pFk,t−1)
− c+ 1|NBt |+ 1
 ∑
j∈NBt \{i}
pHj,t−1 +
∑
l∈NSt \{k}
pFl,t−1
+ |NSt |qSk,t|NBt |+ 1 (37)
and
qSk,t =
1
|NSt |+ 1
(−(c+ 1)pFk,t−1 + b− a+ qEDn+1,t)
− c+ 1|NSt |+ 1
(
(|NBt | − 1)pHi,t−1 + (|NSt | − 1)pFk,t−1
)
− c+ 1|NSt |+ 1
− ∑
j∈NBt \{i}
pHj,t−1 −
∑
l∈NSt \{k}
pFl,t−1
+ |NBt |qBi,t|NSt |+ 1 . (38)
Solving the above two equations together yields
q∗Bi,t =
1
|NBt |+ 1
(
(c+ 1)pHi,t−1 − b+ a− qEDn+1,t
)
− c+ 1|NBt |+ 1
−(|NBt | − 1)pHi,t−1 − (|NSt | − 1)pFk,t +∑
j∈NBt \{i}
pHj,t−1 +
∑
l∈NSt \{k}
pFl,t−1

+
|NSt |
|NBt |+ 1
1
|NSt |+ 1
(−(c+ 1)pFk,t−1 + b− a+ qEDn+1,t)
− |N
S
t |
|NBt |+ 1
c+ 1
|NSt |+ 1
(
(|NBt | − 1)pHi,t−1 + (|NSt | − 1)pFk,t−1
)
− |N
S
t |
|NBt |+ 1
c+ 1
|NSt |+ 1
− ∑
j∈NBt \{i}
pHj,t−1 −
∑
l∈NSt \{k}
pFl,t−1

+
|NSt |
|NBt |+ 1
|NBt |qBi,t
|NSt |+ 1
(39)
implying
q∗Bi,t =
1
n+ 1
(−b+ a− qEDn+1,t)
+
c+ 1
n+ 1
npHi,t−1 − ∑
j∈NBt \{i}
pHj,t−1 −
∑
l∈NSt
pFl,t−1
 . (40)
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Also, inserting (40) into (38) yields
q∗Sk,t =
1
n+ 1
(
b− a+ qEDn+1,t
)
− c+ 1
n+ 1
npFk,t−1 − ∑
j∈NBt
pHj,t−1 −
∑
l∈NSt \{k}
pFl,t−1
 . (41)
Thus, we can calculate∑
j∈NBt
qBj,t −
∑
l∈NSt
qSl,t
=
n
n+ 1
(−b+ a− qEDn+1,t)+ (c+ 1)n+ 1
∑
j∈NBt
pHj,t +
∑
l∈NSt
pFl,t
 . (42)
Finally, inserting (42) into (10) yields
p∗ =
b− a
c+ 1
+
qEDn+1,t +
∑
j∈NBt q
∗B
j,t −
∑
l∈NSt q
∗S
l,t
c+ 1
=
1
n+ 1
(
b− a+ qEDn+1,t
c+ 1
)
+
1
n+ 1
∑
j∈NBt
pHj,t−1 +
∑
l∈NSt
pFl,t−1
 (43)
which completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider the spot foreign exchange market with the following
specifications:
n = 3 a = 1 b = 12 c = 0.2
p0 = 3.8907 P¯ = 3.8 Q¯ = −11 T = 100
MH1,0 = 15 M
F
1,0 = 5 M
H
2,0 = 15 M
F
2,0 = 5
MH3,0 = 15 M
F
3,0 = 5 p
H
1,0 = 3.9500 p
F
1,0 = 3.8500
pH2,0 = 3.9500 p
F
2,0 = 3.8500 p
H
3,0 = 3.9400 p
F
3,0 = 3.8550
One can check with the aid of a computer program that for t = 10 no partition
{N∗Bt , N∗St } of strategic traders {1, 2, 3} can be an equilibrium. 
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